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ABSTRACT      
The paper outlines the sale, with a track lease, in 1993 of the state owned 
New Zealand Railways Corporation to a consortium, TranzRail Holdings 
formed by United States and New Zealand interests. It also notes increases in 
productivity and traffic levels to 1999 with subsequent problems leading to the 
New Zealand Government agreeing in 2003 to repurchase and maintain the 
track. The paper also outlines transfer of effective ownership of the trains and 
related services in 2003 to an Australian company, and in 2008 back to New 
Zealand Government at appreciable net cost. 
After a brief outline of railways in Australia, the paper notes how government 
rail in Tasmania, then owned and operated by the federal Australian National 
Railways Commission, was sold in 1997 with a track lease to a company 
related to TranzRail Holdings. The paper then notes emerging problems after 
initial success, and how after a change in ownership in 2004, the Tasmanian   
track lease was taken back by the public sector in 2007, followed by the trains 
in 2009.  
Other rail asset sales in Australia are also noted along with the high total 
costs of road vehicle operation in Australia and New Zealand.  
 
Key Words New Zealand; Tasmania; Australia; rail asset sales 1 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In 1993, the New Zealand Government sold its rail system with a long term 
track lease. This was followed in 1997 by the first of many Australian rail asset 
sales by government. 
This article will primarily deal with two rail privatizations in New Zealand and 
Tasmania that eventually resulted in the respective governments taking back 
not only the track, but also the trains.  
At the outset, it is of note that the two rail systems of New Zealand and 
Tasmania have relatively small freight tasks. In 1992-93, the New Zealand rail 
                                                
1 Abbreviations Australian National Railway Commission (ANRC) 
Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) 
Australian Transport Network Ltd (ATN) 
billion net tonne kilometres (btkm) 
Bureau of Transport Economics (BTE) 
Council of Australian Governments (CoAG) 
National Rail Corporation (NRC) 
National Transport Commission (NTC) 
Pacific National Tasmania (PNT) 
Surface Transport Costs and Charges (STCC) 
TranzRail Holdings (TRH) 
e-mail address: plaird@uow.edu.au. 
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freight task (prior to sale) was 2.5 billion net tonne kilometres (btkm), and 
reached 4.2 btkm in 2010-11, also since 1992 the Tasmanian rail freight task 
has rarely exceeded 0.5 btkm. By way of contrast, the Australian rail freight 
task in 2009-10 (after some 5 years of rapid growth in iron ore and coal 
exports) was about 259 btkm (Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and 
Regional Economics, 2012).  
Further information on rail privatisation in Australia and New Zealand may be 
found in a paper for the World Bank by Williams et al (2005). However, not all 
people would share in these authors qualified assessment (page 57) that 
"Overall the rail privatization experience in Australia and New Zealand has 
been positive..."  
Full details of all Australian rail asset sales, plus franchises and track leases, 
are outside the scope of this paper. Section 2 outlines the New Zealand rail 
system since the 1980s with the sale by government in 1993 and the taking 
back of the track in 2004 and the trains in 2008. Section 3 sketches Australian 
Railways and Section 4 outlines the Tasmania rail system since the 1970s 
including government taking back the track in 2007 and the trains in 2009. 
Section 5 briefly comments on some aspects of other Australian rail asset 
sales, and topics affecting rail freight competitiveness in Australia. This 
includes the difficult question of road pricing for heavy trucks. The conclusions 
are given in Section 6 whilst Section 7 addresses implications for managerial 
practice and public policy. 
 
 
2.      New Zealand 
 
Railways in New Zealand go back to 1863 with the former provincial 
governments. During the 1870s, gauge unification settled on narrow gauge 
track, and rail expansion with transfer to the central government took place. 
As noted by Heatley and Schwass (2011), "For much of the 20th century, rail 
was regarded not only as core government business but also as an iconic part 
of New Zealand’s journey to prosperity"; also, citing Atkinson (2007, p60), the 
Minister of Railways, Gordon Coates in 1923 noted that “The railways in New 
Zealand have never been regarded, or run, as a profit-making concern.”  
The 1970s and 1980s saw both loss of freight and passenger traffic with 
contraction of the rail system to its present length of about 4000 route km. In 
1978, the 8.9 km Kaimai rail tunnel was opened, thus cutting the rail distance 
between Auckland and Tauranga by 52 km and supporting the later growth of 
Tauranga as a second port for Auckland. During the 1980s, the central 
section of the North Island Main Trunk line linking Auckland and Wellington 
was electrified (at 25 000 volts AC) and upgraded with civil engineering works 
including deviations. 
In 1982, New Zealand Rail was corporatised and faced two major challenges. 
The first challenge was a view held within sections of Treasury that the 
railways could be progressively closed down over a period of 15 years. This 
was on the presumption that the nation’s entire land transport task - 
passengers and freight - could more efficiently be handled by road transport.  
The second challenge was in 1983 when the Government sought to lift rail 
protection, which reserved to rail the carriage of most goods moving a 
distance of more than 150 kilometres. The response of the rail unions to both 
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challenges was to embark on a massive Save Rail campaign. This was 
strongly taken up by the Labor Party in opposition. When Labor won the 1983 
election, it was subsequently made clear that rail could stay only if New 
Zealand Railways was to increase its efficiency and productivity. This was 
achieved with significant downsizing along with track and other investment to 
increase productivity. In addition, rail protection for freight was lifted and a 
mass distance system of road user charges for heavy trucks introduced in the 
late 1970s was retained, with these charges being increased in 1984.  
New Zealand's mass distance charges for heavy trucks have continued to 
date, albeit frozen for some years, when the New Zealand government was 
trying to contain inflation. In 2012, for example for a six axle articulated truck 
with a gross vehicle mass of 45 tonnes  the road user charges were about 
$NZ0.95 per kilometre. For some details of freight in New Zealand, see for 
example, Cavana et al (1997). 
It is also of note that during the 1990s, New Zealand was examining the 
potential commercialisation of roads. This involved a major Land Transport 
Pricing Study with extensive consultation and no fewer than four reports 
leading to a Road Reform Report (New Zealand Ministry of Transport, 1997) 
that raised the option of congestion pricing with road charges to reflect the 
environmental impact of road use. Even though this report was endorsed by 
the New Zealand Prime Minister, at the end of the day, road pricing reform 
was stalled, and New Zealand’s significant car dependence remains. The 
impacts are particularly noticeable in Auckland, and are also felt in other 
major centres. 
A Surface Transport Costs and Charges (STCC) study was later 
commissioned by the New Zealand Ministry of Transport (2005). The study 
provided data on the costs and charges during 2001-02 for the movement of 
freight and passengers for road and rail with a view to answering the question 
“What are the costs of land transport and who is paying them?”  
For 2001-02, road vehicle operating costs were estimated at about $17 billion. 
The STCC study included estimates for various external costs. These 
included additional costs of road accidents not met by insurance ($670m) and 
$111m for environmental costs (including greenhouse gases costed at $25 
per tonne of CO2e). The road user and related charges of $2.63 billion 
included Fuel Excise Duty of $1079m and charges from heavy vehicles at 
$584m (for a freight task of roughly 15 btkm). The external costs for a rail 
freight task of about 4 btkm were estimated at a relatively modest $8.5m. 
In regards to the viability of the rail sector (sub section 5.5) the STCC 
summary noted:  
 
“At the time of the analysis in 2001-2002, the STCC shows that the rail 
network as a whole was not financially viable, with a total annual shortfall of 
$95 million per annum. … Revenues do not cover the cost of upgrading, 
improving or expanding the rail infrastructure. In order to compete with road 
freight, there has been downward pressure on prices for rail. The average rate 
charged by Tranz Rail fell from 12.5c/ntkm in 1993 to 10c/ntkm in 2000 – a 
nominal fall of 20%.”  
 
After noting less than full total cost recovery from both road and rail freight, 
the report (sub section 5.5) found: 
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“… that if the prices paid by commercial vehicles to use the roading network 
were raised to cover more of the costs they generate, this could support a 
shift of suitable traffic to rail which in turn, would be likely to increase the 
overall financial viability of rail. The alternative to such a policy, given the 
Government’s stated intention to retain the rail network, is long term and 
continuing subsidies to the rail network.” 
  
2.1 Sale and initial success 
 
On 17 December 1992, within the scope of existing legislation, the New 
Zealand Government announced its intention to undertake a formal 
privatisation process of New Zealand Rail Ltd. A competitive bidding process 
then followed, involving six bids. A merchant bank,Fay Richwhite and 
Company Ltd, which had previously been an advisor to New Zealand Rail Ltd, 
formed a consortium, including with Wisconsin Central Transportation 
Company and Berkshire Partners LLC (a United States private equity 
company), to be a bidder in the sale process. The consortium, later called 
TranzRail Holdings (TRH), was the successful bidder with an agreement for 
sale and purchasebeing made on 20 July 1993. 
On 30 September 1993, New Zealand Rail Ltd was sold for NZ$400 million to 
TranzRail Holdings with a lease from the Crown (government) to occupy 
certain land for railway purposes. TRH became a listed company in June 
1996 in New Zealand and the United States to raise $175m to retire post sale 
acquired bank debt. In New Zealand, ordinary shares were offered at NZ$6.19 
each and including dividends saw a 26 per cent return on investment in the 
first year.  Later  the shares reached $9 each.  
The initial increase in share value in part reflected the 1996-97 freight task 
increasing to 3.2 btkm (from 2.5 btkm in 1992-93) and modest increases in rail 
and ferry passengers. During 1996-97, TranzRail also acquired 17 used 
locomotives from Queensland Rail and 61 used passenger carriages from 
Britain. In addition, new wagons were acquired, including 21 insulated milk 
wagons (to supply a large North Island factory), coal wagons, and intermodal 
wagons. Thus, TRH chairman Edward A Burkhardt (CEO of Wisconsin 
Central who favoured a longer term approach to rail operations) was able to 
point to "improved results…in a low growth economic environment" whilst 
Managing Director Francis Small could claim an ability to "sustain and 
increase growth" (TRH, 1997, p7 and 17 respectively). 
Further traffic growth took place and in Australia the Productivity Commission 
(1999) was also able to observe increases in labour productivity, asset 
utilisation, and traffic levels since rail privatisation in New Zealand.   
 
2.2     Emerging problems   
 
In 1999, a new chairman (Robert H Wheeler also of Wisconsin Central) and 
Managing Director (Michael Beard) were appointed to TRH.  
The next few years were to see increasing difficulties for TRH with a slight fall 
in the freight task (from a record 4.1 btkm in 1999-2000) and a larger fall in 
freight revenues with increasing competition from road freight operators. In 
addition, there was competition to TRH's interisland freight and passenger 
services. In 2001, the payment of dividends was suspended (8.5 cents per 
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share had been paid each six months up to April 2001) and a fall in share 
price was under way.  
In February 2002, Wisconsin Central (which by then had been acquired by 
Canadian National) and Fay Richwhite sold their controlling stake in TRH. By 
May 2002, shares had fallen to their then lowest value of $NZ2.35.  
Strong restructuring initiatives were put in place by TRH; as noted by Mr 
Beard at a July 2002 special briefing for analysts, fund managers and the 
media (Rails, 2002), these measures included "a massive restructure, 
outsourcing engineering functions and divesting non-core business to 
concentrate on freight." This included sale in 2001 of part of the Tranz Scenic 
long distance passenger services to an experienced Australian rail passenger 
operator West Coast Railway, which resulted in the retention of three 
services, Auckland-Wellington, Christchurch-Greymouth (TranzAlpine) and 
Christchurch-Picton (Tranz Coastal) along with withdrawing other services. 
Some relief to TRH was provided in 2002 by the New Zealand Government 
agreeing to pay $NZ81m to take back track and trains centred on the 
Auckland urban area. These trains were later run, under contract, for the 
Auckland Regional Council. However, TRH's share price continued to fall and 
reached a low of NZ$0.39 in mid 2003. 
Also, in 2002, when the TRH share price was falling, the New Zealand 
Securities Commission launched insider trading proceedings against six 
parties, being Michael Beard, Mark Bloomer, former chief financial officer of 
TRH, Berkshire Fund III, a former Tranz Rail shareholder and former director 
Carl Ferenbach (all settled by March 2006) and in June 2007 Midavia Rail 
Investments Ltd and David Richwhite agreeing to pay $20 million, (with all 
settlements in the case amounting to over $27.5 million) without any 
admission of liability (New Zealand Herald, 2007). Gaynor (2008) estimates 
that the four main original investors realized profits of $370m from the sale of 
their TRH shares. 
By 2001, many people were beginning to question New Zealand rail 
privatisation. A TV One (2001) documentary 'Assignment' that went to air on 
25 October 2001 noted that eight years on, there had been both winners and 
losers in the privatisation of rail. As then seen by Greens Co-Leader Rod 
Donald MP (of a minority parliamentary party) "We gave away rail at a 
ridiculous price." On the programme, Winston Peters MP went further "It was 
a terrible rip off then and it has been seen as that now" (Rails, 2001).  
In addition, there was then growing support for a Green party view (released 
27 March 2001) that a new state owned enterprise should be set up to take 
over ownership of the track and other infrastructure leaving TRH to move 
freight and other operators to move passengers. The formation in 2002 of 
Network Rail in the United Kingdom with the effective collapse of the private 
company Railtrack (that was responsible for British rail track post privatisation 
in 1994) provided support for this view, and taking back the track was agreed 
to by the New Zealand Government in June 2003, with a promise to invest 
$200 million to upgrade the infrastructure. In September 2004, the New 
Zealand Railways Corporation (Ontrack) was formed by the New Zealand 
Government and took over the track from TRH for the consideration of $1. 
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2.3 New owners 
 
In 2003, following withdrawal of a bid for purchase by Rail America, Toll 
Limited in NZ (owned by Toll Holdings Pty Ltd of Australia) made a bid of 75 
cents for each TRH share. This offer was increased to 95 cents, and later to 
$1.10. At the closing date of the higher offer in October 2003, Toll had 
acquired nearly 84 per cent of TRH. Toll's aim to acquire 90 per cent of the 
TRH shares and so be eligible to proceed to compulsory acquisition of the 
balance of shares was initially frustrated by three institutions and many small 
New Zealand share holders.   
The introduction of Toll (with a strong track record of profits and growth in 
Australia) and the government taking back the track provided some grounds 
for optimism, including by Toll, of the viability of rail in New Zealand. As seen 
by Williams et al (2005, p17) "In our view, the counter-factual to privatization 
(i.e. continued public sector operation), would most likely have been less 
successful. It would have been difficult to continue (as the private owner did) 
the efficiency improvements and increased customer focus started in the late 
80s/early 90s under public ownership."  
This view prevailed, although in hindsight, it may have been cheaper for the 
New Zealand Government to have bought in 2003 the entire rail system. Toll 
then set about with a will to improve freight operations, and renamed TRH as 
Toll NZ. In turn, the share price started to recover.  
In 2007, Toll, reached agreement with Third Avenue, a New York investment 
firm (who had purchased just over 10 per cent of Toll NZ at an average cost of 
$1.63 a share (Gaynor, 2008) to pay $3.00 per share. Toll then proceeded to 
compulsory acquisition of the balance.  This share price valued the company 
at $700m. 
In 2004, Toll NZ took back the intercity trains. However, in mid 2006, Toll 
proposed, in the absence of a government subsidy, to withdraw the Auckland 
– Wellington passenger train service. This led to a storm of protest and extra 
passengers with people anxious to ride the historic and scenic train route 
before services were withdrawn. On the last week of scheduled operation, in 
September 2006 and without any subsidy, Toll agreed to continue to provide 
the service, albeit with fewer trains.  
By 2008, Toll was actively seeking lower track access fees. As noted by the 
then managing director David Jackson (2008):   
 
"We have taken no dividends, we have improved the efficiencies, we have 
motivated staff and we have a business that is now viable…(however), road 
transport in itself does not carry its full costs. There is no recognition of road 
operators receiving a subsidy but arguably they do. Rail operations the world 
over do not meet their costs and require significant subsidization.” 
 
Although this claim regarding subsidization may have applied to Toll NZ with 
its modest freight and small passenger task, it did not apply to large rail fright 
operators including North American Class I railroads, Australia’s iron ore rail 
haulage, and many larger passenger operators.  
As noted by Briginshaw (2008, p2), although Toll NZ had initially agreed to 
pay to Ontrack (formed in 2004) $NZ56m for track access charges, and this 
was upheld by arbitration in preference to a later offer by Toll NZ to pay 
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$NZ48m, the government “was very unhappy at being forced to subsidize a 
foreign private company” and initially offered to buy Toll Rail for $500m.  
 
2.4 Buy back and rebuilding 
 
In May 2008, Toll NZ agreed to sell their rail operations to the New Zealand 
Labour Government for $NZ665m plus other considerations including 
payment of some debt incurred by Toll. Although the decision was welcomed 
by two minority parties (Greens and New Zealand First), the leader of the 
Opposition and National Party, John Key MP (who became Prime Minister 
following an election and change of government in November 2008) opposed 
the decision. So also did a former Labour Minister for Transport, Richard 
Prebble. From an international perspective, Briginshaw (2008) suggested that 
it would have been better to have the rail services operated as a concession, 
rather than the government to become (again) a rail freight operator, and 
noted “All too often governments make decisions without thinking through the 
consequences.”  
Gaynor (2008), noting that since 1990 the New Zealand government "spent or 
committed nearly $4 billion on rail in the debt write-offs, equity injections, 
asset buy-backs, subsidies, grants and planned track expenditure," asked if 
this money would have been better spent on the road network.  
This amount would include the $NZ400m sale price in late 1993 being some 
$559.6m in mid 2008 terms Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2012), being 
more than offset by direct government outlays exceeding $965m. These 
outlays comprised the $NZ81 million outlaid in 2002 (about $95.5m in 2008) 
to repurchase part of the Auckland network, the $200m committed in 2003 for 
track rehabilitation, and the repurchase cost of $665m in June 2008. 
Following the return of the country’s rail operation to public ownership on July 
1 2008 and its relaunch as KiwiRail, Prime Minister Helen Clark MP noted, 
rising oil prices and that: 
 
“It should be acknowledged that Toll Holdings has made good progress in our 
rail system in recent years. But it also has become clear that our rail system 
cannot survive without substantial Government subsidies into the future. That, 
together with the need to develop a more sustainable and integrated transport 
system for our country, makes the case for public ownership compelling in the 
21st Century” (KiwiRail 2008a). 
 
The Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer, Dr Michael Cullen went further and 
stated:  
 
“The selling of our rail system in the 1990s was followed by asset stripping 
and a failure to properly invest in the services. At a time of high petrol prices 
and concern about climate change, New Zealand cannot afford a substandard 
rail system."  
“We also need to invest more in our rail infrastructure so we can see rail 
makes its full contribution to the sustainable, modern transport sector our 
economy needs" (KiwiRail 2008b).  
 
  8 
A New Zealand Treasury perspective is provided by Wilson (2011) who notes, 
inter alia, that: 
 
"A view that rail freight could be commercially viable proved 
optimistic…Ultimately the rail system reverted to government ownership and 
public funding because although Tranz Rail and Toll faced hard budget 
constraints, the public, including significant parts of the business community, did 
not find the consequences of the hard budget constraint acceptable." 
 
In its first annual report, for 2008-09, KiwiRail noted reintegration of the above 
and below rail operations on 1 October 2008 and the movement of about 
14.4m tonnes of freight with a freight task of 3.96 btkm (down from 2007-08); 
and measures to increase rail freight (including over 700m litres of milk and 
the commissioning of new container flat wagons and ordering new 
locomotives). The ongoing upgrading of Auckland and Wellington passenger 
services (with respective patronages of 7.65m and 11.9m in 2008) and 
operation of interisland ferry services (three ships) were also noted. 
The 2009-10 KiwiRail (2010) Annual Report, whilst noting no increase in the 
freight and passenger task, was able to report further upgrading of the 
Auckland and Wellington urban rail networks, and following development of a 
10 year strategic plan estimated to cost $4.6 billion, government support for a 
Rail “Turn around plan” to include growing the rail freight task with an 
investment by government of $750m over three years.  
By 2010-11, KiwiRail was able to report a modest increase in the freight task 
(about 4.2 btkm) with more revenue (nearly $NZ400m). Wellington metro 
network upgrades on several fronts were completed to be ready for new 
Matangi electric passenger trains (1500 volts DC). Good progress was made 
towards Auckland’s urban rail track upgrading and electrification at 25,000 
volts AC due in 2013-14 at a total cost of about $1.6 billion. However, in part 
due to two major earthquakes near Christchurch (in September 2010 and 
February 2011 with numerous aftershocks), both long distance train and inter-
islander passenger numbers were down from 2009-10. 
Auckland’s urban rail services, which are now operated by an expanded 
Auckland City Council (formed in 2010 after amalgamation with other 
Councils) have seen significant increases in patronage. This is now 
approaching 11m passengers per year; some 12 years ago, it was only about 
2m per year. Electric trains operated by the Greater Wellington Regional 
Council had 11.3m passengers in 2011-12, with more expected in 2012-13. 
 
 
3. Australian railways 
 
Railways in Australia go back to the 1850s. At the time of Australian 
Federation in 1901, private railways were limited in extent and there were six 
State rail systems. Commonwealth Railways were formed in 1917 to operate 
a line in the Northern Territory and the Port Augusta to Kalgoorlie railway. 
Australia continues to operate trains, using three main different railway 
gauges (broad (1600 mm or 5' 3''), standard (1435 mm or 4' 8.5") and narrow 
(1067 mm or 3'6'')). 
In 1975, legislation provided for the formation of the Australian National 
Railways Commission (ANRC) to take over Commonwealth Railways and 
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operate rail services in South Australia and Tasmania. This occurred in 1978. 
In 1991, a National Rail Corporation (NRC) was formed following an 
intergovernmental agreement to provide interstate rail freight services, and 
jointly owned by the Federal, New South Wales, and Victorian Governments.  
By 1995, rail freight services were provided by six government operators and 
several private companies. The six government rail systems then comprised 
ANRC, NRC and the four State systems of Queensland, New South Wales, 
Victoria and Western Australia, with an aggregate freight task of about 62 
billion tonne kilometers (btkm). Of this, some 28 btkm was due to the haulage 
of coal. In 1993-94, Australia's Government rail systems had an aggregate rail 
freight loss of some $200 million (Bureau of Industry Economics, 1995). The 
main private operators in 1995 were iron ore railways in the Pilbara region of 
Western Australia with a combined freight task of 47 btkm.  
By 1998, with increasing productivity and micro-economic reform, three 
government rail freight systems losses had become profitable. This was one 
factor leading to rail freight privatisation. A further factor was the 
implementation of National Competition Policy driven by the Council of 
Australian Governments (CoAG) which required, inter alia, third party access 
to Government rail track (Productivity Commission 1999, Scrafton 2001, and 
Owens 2003).  
The first sale of government rail assets in Australia was initiated by the 
Australian (Federal) Government in 1997, and comprised the Tasmanian rail 
system (TasRail), South Australian intrastate freight operations, and, 
interstate passenger trains, all formerly owned and operated by ANRC. A 
1997 intergovernmental agreement led to the formation of a federal Australian 
Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) to take over ANRC's interstate track, and to 
lease interstate mainline track from Victoria, New South Wales and 
Queensland. This was followed by rail privatisation, with track leases, by the 
State Governments of Victoria (1999) and Western Australia (2000). In 
February 2002, NRC and the New South Wales Rail Freight (above rail) 
operations were sold together to Pacific National; which was then jointly 
owned by two Australian listed companies, Patrick and Toll.  
Along with Williams et al (2005), further details of Australian rail privatisation 
are also given by the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics (2006) 
and the Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics (2012). 
For an account of rail freight operations in Australia  by this writer to 1995, 
and more recently to 2007, see  Laird (1998 and 2009). 
 
  
4. Tasmania 
 
When finally acquired in 1978 by the Australian National Railways 
Commission (ANRC), the Tasmanian Government Railways was a run down 
system whose main purpose was to freight as passenger services were being 
eliminated. The ANRC’s main challenge was to integrate the former South 
Australian and Commonwealth rail systems, and to improve operational and 
financial performance. This included reducing significant rail deficits. 
At an early stage, ANRC formed a TasRail unit to operate the Tasmanian rail 
system. The freight task, due both to limited tonnages and relatively short 
distances, was (and continues to be) small. As such, the question was often 
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asked as to whether the entire system should be closed down, transferring all 
land freight to trucks. This question was indeed addressed in two studies by 
the Bureau of Transport Economics (BTE -1987 and 1991). In each study, the 
conclusion was reached that after consideration of all costs, including that of 
the road system costs and of external costs, rail freight services were worth 
retaining in Tasmania. As noted (BTE, 1991, pxvi),  
“A full or partial closure of TasRail would further increase heavy truck volumes 
and this would, among other things, accelerate road damage. It is estimated 
that closure of TasRail would affect 967 kilometres of road sections and result 
in increased road reconstruction and maintenance costs... On balance the 
social cost-benefit analysis suggest that society would benefit from retention 
of TasRail. However, the full realisation of potential benefits available would 
depend on a restructuring of TasRail...."  
In addition, each of the two studies had recommendations for improving the 
efficiency of rail operations over some 787km of track. This included the 1991 
report noting a downward trend of rail deficits (from $41.9m in 1977-78 to 
$16.5m in 1989-90 with a freight task varying from about 0.24 btkm  to 0.46 
btkm). 
The improved performance of TasRail by ANRC reflected (BTE, 1991, p1) 
“provision of modern locomotives (some purchased for Queensland Railways) 
and rolling stock, …track rehabilitation, modernisation of maintenance 
facilities, …changes in operating practices” along with a considerable 
reduction in staff numbers. As noted (p10) “The primary goal for TasRail is to 
achieve break-even by 1995-96, that is covering accounting costs including 
interest and depreciation.” 
The 1991 BTE report also included a detailed financial analysis of TasRails 
past performance and its future prospects to 2010 prepared for the BTE by 
Fay, Richwhite Australia Limited. 
          
4.1 Sale and initial success 
 
In 1995, due to an expanding role for the National Rail Corporation (NRC), 
ANRC’s role and function was changing. In March 1996, after a change of 
federal government, a review of both ANRC and NRC was commissioned. 
The review, conducted by Mr John Brew recommended, in part, a break up of 
ANRC with part privatisation and the formation of a Track Access authority. In 
respect of Tasmania, Brew (1996) in part recommended transfer of the 
Tasmanian railway system to private short line operators, or if this was not 
achievable, then transfer to the Tasmanian Government. Brew (1996, p58) 
also noted recent loss of freight traffic from rail to road, and that “TasRail’s 
current and projected operating results indicate that it is not a profitable 
business.”  
The federal government then proceeded to sell TasRail along with two other 
parts of ANRC. This sale process required new legislation, and an inquiry by a 
Senate Committee (1997, para 7.41) which recommended that "before 
proceeding with the sale process, the government should develop a coherent 
land transport policy framework, taking into account financial, economic, 
social and environmental goals and recommending mid and long term 
investment programs for road and rail in all major corridors." 
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During parliamentary debate, the need to improve the nation's rail system as 
well as the option of letting TasRail revert to the Tasmanian Government, was 
canvassed. Instead, on 28 August 1997, agreements were signed including 
for the sale of TasRail Pty Ltd (then a subsidiary of ANRC) to Australian 
Transport Network Ltd (ATN) for $22 million, with operational railway land 
transferred to the Tasmanian Government with ATN granted a 50 year lease 
of the land (Australian National Audit Office, 1998, who also examined the 
sale process and made seven recommendations). The sale was completed on 
14 November 1997, with the sale agreement committing ATN to capital 
expenditure of $20m over a four year period. 
ATN was formed by Wisconsin Central who held a one third interest in ATN, 
whilst TransRail Holdings held a two thirds interest. Like TRH in New Zealand, 
ATN was initially able to grow the Tasmanian rail freight task. To assist with 
this growth, some locomotives were moved from New Zealand to Tasmania, 
and two lines were reopened. As noted (Productivity Commission, 1999, 
p147), Tasrail reported an operating profit for its first 7 months of operation, 
which was for "...the first time in 130 years." 
 
4.2     Ownership changes 
 
In 2001, when Canadian National acquired Wisconsin Central, it then set out 
to dispose of its rail assets in Tasmania as well as New Zealand. The sale of 
the Tasmanian rail system took over two years, when it was acquired, in 
February 2004, by Pacific National, who formed Pacific National Tasmania 
(PNT). This acquisition was not opposed by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (2004) who in a statement noted that "the acquisition 
was unlikely to substantially lessen competition in any market…(also) that 
there was only one significant freight rail operator in Tasmania, and that this 
would remain the case after the acquisition… " 
Later in 2002, the new owners acquired the privately owned Emu Bay Railway 
(the 130km Melba line). However, by 2005, there were indications that not all 
was well with PNT. By then, the entire network had a permanent 60 km/h 
speed restriction, for all trains at all times, plus numerous speed restrictions 
around tight radius curves and over older bridges. On each line there was no 
shortage of temporary speed restrictions reflecting a variety of track 
maintenance problems. The axle load limit was 18 tonnes as against 25 
tonnes on mainline track in mainland Australia or 30 tonnes on the coal lines 
of the Hunter Valley of NSW.  The track was clearly substandard. 
In October 2005, PNT announced that it would cease freight rail services in 
Tasmania (other than for cement from Railton to Devonport, a distance of 
22km, and minerals on the Melba line) unless financial assistance was 
provided by the Federal and Tasmanian Governments to upgrade the network 
(Tasmanian  Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources, 2007). In 
addition, a 2005 study had found that “the forced shift of freight from rail to 
road in Tasmania as a result of rail services ceasing to be available would 
have resulted in: additional direct costs of more than $17 million per annum to 
the Tasmanian businesses that rely on rail; externalities of more than $6 
million per annum; and additional road maintenance costs of over $1 million 
per annum.” 
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Following negotiations, on 1 January 2007, the Tasmanian Government 
acquired all rail tracks (other than the Melba line) and below rail assets for the 
sum of $1. At the same time, the Australian Government agreed to provide 
$78m to upgrade the Tasmanian Rail network as part of a Rail Rescue 
Package, and PNT agreed to provide above rail services on the network and 
upgrade locomotives and rolling stock along with making provision for any 
other accredited rail operator to use the network at agreed rail access fees.  
  
4.3   Buy back 
 
Following further negotiations and passage of the Rail Company Act 2009, the 
Tasmanian Railway Pty Ltd, trading as TasRail and owned by the Tasmanian 
Government, was established as a vertical integrated freight railway to 
operate rail freight services formerly offered by PNT. The purchase price was 
$32m, comprising $26m for locomotives and rolling stock plus workshops and 
other buildings and $6m for an ore shiploader at the port of Burnie. In 
addition, the Melba line was also acquired, the Australian Government agreed 
to provide funding to 2013-14 amounting to $126m (for capacity improvement 
and capital upgrades) to supplement the $78m rail rescue package, and, the 
Tasmanian Government committed $40m over 10 years. The additional 
funding was to allow for replacement of locomotives and wagons (at the end 
of their economic life) as well as a new $4m train control centre (Tasrail, 
2011a).  
On 13 December 2011, a contract was signed for $A607m to acquire 17 new 
locomotives to replace the existing “life expired fleet” (TasRail 2011b). In 
addition, two new rail intermodal freight services were started in 2012 and four 
locomotives were acquired from Queensland to meet this increase in 
business.  
Tasrail moved about 2.3m tonnes of freight in 2010-11, earning $31m and 
making a small operating profit but incurring an overall loss of $4.6m, so there 
is some way to go from “Rail Rescue” to that of a of "Rail Resurgence” 
(TasRail 2011b). However, the Tasmanian Government has a clear vision "for 
a viable rail network as part of an efficient land transport system." 
Moreover, as previous studies have found transport costs to users of land 
freight services, road system costs, and external costs would increase if the 
Tasmanian Rail system was to close. 
TasRail (2012) reported in 2012 an impairment expense of $31.7m and a total 
comprehensive loss of $36.3m with its operations in moving some 2.34m of 
freight during 2010-11, taking the equivalent of 100,000 B-Double (large) truck 
movements off the roads and reducing greenhouse gas emissions by over 
46,000 tonnes. The loss is regarded by management as a turning point in 
rehabilitating rail in Tasmania. However, as seen by an opposition spokesman 
Hidding (2012), which aptly summarizes the Tasmanian situation: "If publicly-
owned monopoly businesses lose money, how on earth are Tasmanian 
businesses in the private sector supposed to make a quid?" 
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5.      Recent changes in Australia 
 
Subsequent to the World Bank sponsored review (Williams et al, 2005), the 
changes to ownership of railways in Australia have included: 
 
* transferring of Victoria's below rail assets including a track lease (acquired 
from Freight Australia in 2004) from Pacific National in May 2007 to the 
Victorian Government, for a consideration of $133.8 million.  
* change in ownership of Pacific National in 2007 from Patrick and Toll to a 
new listed company called Asciano.  
* part of Queensland Rail,  including some track and coal trains, being sold in 
November 2010 as QR National as an Initial Public Offering. 
* Genesee and Wyoming Inc completing in December 2010 the acquisition of 
the assets of FreightLink Pty Ltd including a 50 year lease on the 1420 km 
Alice Springs to Darwin railway (completed in 2003) that was placed in 
receivership in November 2008. 
  
In addition, it is of note that in December 2002, following the cessation of 
National Express trains operations in Victoria, their regional passenger train 
franchise was transferred back to the public sector, whilst their Melbourne 
tram and train franchises were transferred to other franchise holders.  
 
5.1 Some outstanding Australian rail issues 
 
Along with under-investment in interstate mainline track linking Australia's 
three largest cities and regional Australia (see, for example, a Rail Projects 
Taskforce, 1999, a House of Representatives Standing Committee, 2007, and 
Laird, 1998 and 2011), and the ongoing multiplicity of railway gauges in 
Australia, the performance of the Australian rail freight industry in the non bulk 
sector has also been impeded by a multiplicity of state based regulators. A 
good background paper on rail regulation is given by the BTE (2006).  
Progress on regulatory reform has been slow despite a Productivity 
Commission (2006) freight report noting the need for ‘…achieving a nationally 
consistent approach to access and regulation of the rail sector,’ Australia 
having a National Transport Commission (NTC) since 2004, and various 
Council of Australian Governments (CoAG) agreements.  However, following 
an intergovernmental agreement, Australia is to have a National Rail Safety 
Regulator as of 1 January 2013. 
A further factor affecting rail freight competitiveness is road pricing for heavy 
trucks. Here, charges are set on a national basis by the Australian Transport 
Council comprising Australia's many ministers of transport as recommended 
by NTC by way of a 'determination'. The NTC charges were subject to an 
inquiry by the Productivity Commission (2006) that in part endorsed the NTC 
methodology whilst noting that it is “conservative” by international standards 
(i.e. resulting in lower charges). Elsewhere, this writer (Laird, 2006) has 
argued under-recovery of road system costs from articulated trucks was then 
about $1.5 billion per annum, with other external costs of a further $1.5 billion 
per annum. 
In May 2010, a major Review of Australia's future tax system (see 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au) made several pertinent recommendations for 
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road pricing reform. These included that CoAG "should accelerate the 
development of mass-distance-location pricing for heavy vehicles…" 
However, progress towards competitive neutrality for road and rail track 
access pricing for trucks and freight trains continues to be slow.  
As observed by Patterson (1999) and noted by Scrafton (2001), "rail and sea 
transport are not achieving their potential in the current system, while road 
and air transport are over-used to compensate.  The result is a system that 
inflates national costs and energy use."   
As noted (Laird, 2011), road vehicles used about 31 billion litres of fuel during 
2011; and a more efficient and competitive rail systems coupled with selected 
rail investment on current networks (excluding High Speed Rail currently 
under examination by the Australian Government) and road pricing reform has 
the potential to reduce liquid fuel use by 2.5 billion litres per year.  
 
  
6.      Findings and discussion  
 
It is clear that the New Zealand Government in selling in 1993 its rail system 
and the Australian Government in selling TasRail in 1997 to the private sector 
incurred many subsequent costs to government.  
Both rail systems with their new private sector owners were initially able to 
grow freight traffic. However, as highways continued to be upgraded with 
more and heavier trucks competing for freight, and the cost of maintaining rail 
track to a good standard began to become a burden, problems started to 
emerge. With Wisconsin Central as a major shareholder in both systems and 
then onselling the two rail systems to Canadian National, the problems were 
not addressed. In each case, the initial solution was for the relevant 
governments to “take back the track”; New Zealand in 2004 and Tasmania in 
2007. Despite this giving some improvement in rail finances and prospects, 
both rail systems reverted to full government ownership (in 2008 and 2009 
respectively). 
Provision of rail freight services can confer wider environmental and social 
benefits, and in some cases may be regarded as a Community Service 
Obligation. The alternative of putting such rail freight onto road, when all costs 
are considered, can be a costly option. However, if rail subsidies are to be 
paid, the question arises as to whether they should be paid to a private sector 
provider or a government agency. The experience, at least in the New 
Zealand and Tasmanian cases, suggests that the subsidies may better be 
directed to a government agency, charged with the responsibility of providing 
efficient and cost effective rail freight (and passenger) services. 
In the Tasmanian case, given a much smaller freight track, a decision by 
government that the rail system should be retained, and the rehabilitation 
required, it is considered appropriate that it continue to be government owned. 
In this case, the owner since 2009 has been the Tasmanian Government, who 
relinquished its rail system in a 1975 agreement to the Australian 
Government. 
Clearly, private companies have a duty to look after their shareholders 
interests. However, the experience of rail asset sales in both New Zealand 
and Tasmania does highlight a latent failure of privatising inherently loss 
making activities that are for the 'public good'. 
  15 
A further dimension to public ownership, made explicit in 2008 by the New 
Zealand Government, is rail’s superior energy efficiency when compared to 
road freight, and its ability to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
 
7. Implications for managerial practice and public policy 
 
Operating a national rail system presents challenges on many fronts. These 
challenges include not only day to day train operations but also securing 
sufficient revenue for track maintenance. The ability to generate revenue from 
rail freight in many countries, including Australia, is often compromised by 
rails major competitor of road freight operating over public infrastructure with 
arguable low rates of road cost recovery. However, even in New Zealand, with 
heavy trucks paying mass distance based pricing, problems surfaced after the 
first seven years of operation. 
The New Zealand, Tasmanian and Victorian experiences with long term rail 
track leases by government to the private sector, like that in the United 
Kingdom, has not been a happy one. 
From a public policy perspective, although selected rail privatisation in certain 
situations can confer advantages, in some instances (excluding successful 
'short line' operations), it can lend to either a complete loss of service, or, a 
need for subsidies from government. If privatisation is embarked on, it is 
necessary to give very careful attention to the conditions of sale or lease. 
The article suggests that certain low traffic railways may be better retained in 
public ownership, with conditions to ensure efficient and competitive 
operations. 
In the case of New Zealand railways, privatisation also underscored the 
challenge of a bidder in part connected to a consultant to the government 
owned railways prior to their being offered for sale.The article noted the sale 
price, of $NZ400 in late 1993 being some $559.6 million in mid 2008 terms 
(rbnz.govt.nz), being outweighed being more than offset by direct government 
outlays of $1320m including the remaining repurchase cost of $665 in June 
2008. 
Further research could include an examination of the costs and benefits of the 
many rail privatisations in mainland Australia that occurred from 1997 to 2010. 
In some instances, these have provided stern lessons for both government 
and the private sector. A further question is whether some transport policy 
reform by government prior to a rail asset sale or lease would improve not 
only the price paid to government but also the prospect for successful 
privatisation with adequate returns to the new private owners. There is also 
the question of incentives for the new owners to invest and grow traffic in 
challenging areas,  including that of non-bulk freight.  
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